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Shingler: Antitrust Law

ANTITRUST LAW
ANTITRUST LAW AND THE SPORTS
LEAGUE RELOCATION RULES
1.

INTRODUCTION

In 1982, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California held that the National Football League
(NFL) had violated the federal antitrust laws by attempting to
prevent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. l The
Ninth Circuit approved this result. 2 Yet when the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California held that
the National Basketball Association (NBA) had similarly violated the same antitrust laws by attempting to prevent the San
Diego Clippers from moving to Los Angeles,3 the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the decision:' How can these seemingly
inconsistent results be reconciled?
This article will focus on the Ninth Circuit's analysis of federal antitrust law as applied to sports league relocation rules.
Primary attention will be directed to the court's most recent
opinion in this area, NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc." In this
case, the Ninth Circuit held that sports league created restrictions on franchise movement do not constitute per se violations
of antitrust law.6 Therefore, the court reasoned, such restrictions
1. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders 1].
2. ld. at 570.
3. National Basketball Association v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562, 565 (9th
Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Clippers] (SDC Basketball Club is an abbreviation for San Diego
Clippers Basketball Club.)
4. ld. at 570.
5. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were
Nelson, J., and Beezer, J.).
6. ld. at 568.

35
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must be evaluated under the rule of reason antitrust analysis.?
II. FACTS
In the early 1980's, the San Diego Clippers operated as a
professional basketball team in San Diego. 8 The franchise is a
member of the National Basketball Association (NBA), an organization of professional basketball teams that operates as a
joint venture under New York law. 9 When the team considered a
move to Los Angeles, the NBA brought suit in the Southern District of California to prevent an unauthorized move by one of its
franchises. 1o This dispute was resolved when the parties stipulated that the Clippers would stay in San Diego, and that any
further disputes would be litigated in the Southern District of
California. 11
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit held that the National Football
League (NFL) had violated antitrust laws when it attempted to
prevent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. 12 Seeing this as a window of opportunity, the Clippers informed the
7. Id. at 567.
8. Id. at 564.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders 11; see also
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356
(9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Raiders II].
In Raiders I, the court considered the antitrust implications of the Raiders move
from Oakland to Los Angeles. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 138l. The Raiders, without permission from the National Football League, relocated to the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. Id. at 1385. The NFL filed a contract suit against the Raiders in state court and
obtained an injunction preventing the move. Id. The Raiders, joining the Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum, cross-claimed against the NFL asserting that the NFL's rule requiring approval by three-quarters of the NFL teams for franchise moves violated the antitrust laws. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict which had found that the NFL's
three-quarter rule constituted an antitrust violation. Id. at 140l.
In Raiders II, the court considered the damages incurred by the Raiders as a result
of the NFL's violation of the antitrust laws. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1356. The court
determined that the treble damages awarded to the Raiders as a result of the two year
delay in moving to Los Angeles must be offset by the NFL's loss of franchise opportunity
in the Los Angeles area. Id. at 1366. More pointedly, the court held that the antitrust
award must be reduced by an amount equivilent to the difference in value of locating a
new NFL team in Oakland, as opposed to Los Angeles. Id.
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NBA of its intention to move to Los Angeles. 13 The Clippers asserted that any attempt by the NBA to prevent the move would
violate the antitrust laws. 14 To avoid potential liability, the NBA
scheduled the Clippers games in Los Angeles. lli
With the Clippers already in Los Angeles, the NBA
amended its constitution by adopting Article 9A, a new rule governing franchise moves. 16 Article 9A requires that a simple majority of the member teams approve all team moves. 17 Subsequent to adopting Article 9A, the NBA sought declaratory relief
in the Southern District of California. IS The league asserted that
it was not a violation of the antitrust laws for the NBA to evaluate and assess limits on franchise movement, and that the league
could assess charges against the Clippers for its unauthorized relocation. 19 The Clippers argued that its move to Los Angeles
complied with Article 9 of the NBA Constitution, and that Article 9A was not adopted until after the Clippers had moved. 20
Under Article 9, whenever a franchise moves into a territory occupied by another team, the moving franchise must receive permission from the team already in the territory.21 The Los Angeles Lakers granted the Clippers permission to move into the Los
Angeles area. 22 Though the NBA acknowledged that the Clippers satisfied the dictates of Article 9, the league asserted that
this article was not the only stricture on franchise movement.23
13. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Brief for Appellee at 35, National Basketball Association v. SDC Basketball
Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1986)(No. 86-5891).
18. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564. The NBA argued that Article 9A was a new constitutional provision codifying previous practice. Id. This practice was evidenced by a 37 year
history in which every team move was preceded by approval of the NBA Board of Governors. Brief for Appellant at 24, National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1986)(No. 86-5891). The Clippers argued that Article 9A was rather an
amendment to Article 9 that, by virtue of the NBA Constitution, required unanimous
approval by the member teams. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564. The Clippers thus argued that
Article 9A was not properly adopted at the time of the Clippers' move, when the Clippers voted against it. Id.
19. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 564-65.
20. Id. at 564. Article 9 provided that no team could move into a territory in which
another team operated without that team's approval. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Clippers complied with the NBA Constitution in that the Los Angeles
Lakers agreed in writing to waive their rights under Article 9. Id. The NBA argued,
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Rather, the league as a body must be permitted to consider
franchise moves. 24 The Clippers argued that such consideration
by the NBA would violate the antitrust laws.215
Finding no genuine issues of material fact, the district court
concluded as a matter of law that the NBA had violated the antitrust laws, and therefore granted summary judgment for the
Clippers.26 From this judgment, the NBA appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.27
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The basic requirements for jurisdiction under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act are an actual controversy and a dispute within the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction.
The United States Constitution and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act require an actual controversy as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction.28 The Supreme Court has held that
however, that the league must be permitted to consider team moves. [d. Article 9, it
contended, limited the actions of the NBA, but did not prescribe the only limits on team
moves. [d.
24. [d.
25. [d. at 565.
26. [d.
27. [d.
28. Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-Between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1983), provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except
with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under
section 7428 of Internal Reveune Code of 1954, any court of
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have
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the controversy must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination.29 Thus, the dispute must be definite and concrete,
not abstract or hypothetical. 30 The Court has conceded that it
would be difficult to fashion a test that would, in every case,
de~ermine the existence of an actual controversy.31
In declaratory relief actions, the Supreme Court has required a substantial controversy between parties with adverse
legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.32 The Court has observed,
however, that the difference between an abstract question and
an actual controversy, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, is
necessarily one of degree. 33 Thus, though both the U.S. Constitution and the Declaratory Judgment Act require an actual controversy before a federal court can exercise jurisdiction, the
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.
The Constitution requires "case or controversy;" the Declaratory Judgment Act requires an "actual controversy." For additional discussion of these concepts, see Annotation, Case, Controversy, or Actual Controversy, 40 L.Ed. 2d 783 (Law. Coop. 1975).
29. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-42, reh. den. 300 U.S. 687
(1937). Moreover, the Court regards actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment
Act to mean the same as case or controversy under the constitution. [d. at 239. In Aetna,
plaintiff insurance company issued defendant's spouse five insurance policies. [d. at 237.
Plaintiff sought a declartory judgment stating that it was not obligated to pay under the
policies because there had been a lapse in the premiums paid. [d. at 239. The lower court
held that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because there was no controversy between the parties. [d. at 236. The appeals court affirmed. [d. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the complaint did in fact present an actual controversy. [d. at 244.
30. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). The
difference between an abstract question and a controversy contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if possible, to
fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy.
[d.
31. [d.
32. [d. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient inlmediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment. [d. Petitioner Maryland Casualty issued an insurance policy to
Pacific Coal and Oil Co., which purported to indemnify the insured in the event of an
accident involving one of the company's trucks. [d. at 271. The Court held that a substantial controversy existed between the parties when they disputed the extent of coverage under the policy. [d. at 273. See also, Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792
F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986). In Wickland, a property owner sought declaratory relief
against the previous owner. [d. The plaintiff asked the court to declare that the defendant was responsible for the hazardous waste materials present on the property. [d. at
889. Finding that the suit presented an actual controversy, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's dismissal of the claim, and remanded the case for trial. [d. at 893.
33. Maryland Casualty, 312 U.S. 270, 273.
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Court has acknowledged that it is not always clear when an actual controversy will be present. 34

In addition to an actual controversy, the court must have

subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. 3!> The United States
Constitution confers jurisdiction to the federal courts for all
matters arising under the constitution or laws of the federal government. 36 To determine if the controversy presents a federal
question, the U.S. Supreme Court has long adhered to the wellpleaded complaint rule. 37 The Court has held that this rule bars
a plaintiff from invoking federal question jurisdiction by anticipating in the complaint a defense the defendant may assert.38
34.Id.
35. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1983). The Act requires an
actual controversy within the court's jurisdiction. Id. One commentator has observed:
When deciding where to file suit one of the first questions that
must be answered is whether the court chosen has the power
or competence to decide the kind of controversy that is involved. This requirement typically is stated in terms of
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and should be distinguished from questions of personal
jurisdiction, which focus on the court's authority to enter a
judgment binding on the particular defendants involved.
J. F'RIEDENTHAL, M KANE, AND A MILLER, CML PROCEDURE, § 2.1 (1985).
This discussion of subject matter jurisdiction shall be limited to federal question
jurisdiciton. Diversity jurisdiction is not appropriate here because there are five NBA
teams in California, including the Clippers. Thus, diversity is not complete as required
by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
36. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This section states that the federal courts shall
have jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." Id. See supra note 28.
37. Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877). Keyes, a landowner
in Northern California, filed suit in state court to restrain the defendants from conducting their hydraulic mining operation. Id. Hydraulic mining is a process by which
water is sprayed, under high pressure, at a hillside to uncover the gold contained therein.
Id. at 199-200. This causes the rivers below to become muddy. Id. at 200. Defendant
sought removal to federal court, but was denied because the complaint did not present a
federal question. Id. at 204.
38. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottely, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). This case
represents the classic illustration of the well-pleaded complaint rule. As settlement for
injuries caused by the railroad, the Mottleys accepted free lifetime passes on the train.
Id. at 250. This agreement was honored for 29 years, until 1907, when a federal statute
was enacted prohibiting the issuance of free passes. Id. at 150-51. The Mottleys sued the
railroad in federal court, seeking specific performance. Id. The lower court found for the
Mottleys, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Mottleys' complaint failed
to raise a federal question. Id. at 154. The Court stated that it is not enough to anticipate a defense for a federally based claim. Id. at 153. For subject matter jurisdiction, the
federal question must be raised in the complaint as a part of the plaintiff's case. Id. See
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The Supreme Court has held that the well-pleaded complaint rule applies to declaratory relief actions as well.39 Application of the rule in the context of an action for declaratory relief,
however, is far more difficult.40 The problem stems from the
rigid rule that the federal question must appear on the face of
the well-pleaded complaint.41 In Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum CO.,42 the Court concluded that declaratory judgment actions should be heard by federal courts only if the coercive acalso Effects Associates, Inc. v. Larry Cohen, 817 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff, a film
production company, sued defendant for copyright infringement. Id. at 73. The district
court dismissed the claim for lack of a federal question. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that the claim presented a federal question under the federal copyright laws. Id.
at 74. The court, citing Louisville and N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, stated that
" . . . a claim arises under federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction on
the basis of a well-pleaded complaint, not from anticipation of possible affirmative defenses." Id. at 73.
39. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). Plaintiffs filed a complaint, seeking a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act, which placed
the liability limit of a nuclear power plant at 560 million dollars, was unconstitutional.
Id. at 67. The Supreme Court found that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the
case. Id. at 71. It also found that the Price-Anderson Act was constitutional. Id. at 84.
Justice Rehnquist, writing in concurrence, observed: "This Court has held that the wellpleaded complaint rule applied in Mottley is fully applicable in cases seeking only declaratory relief, because the Declaratory Judgment Act merely expands the re,medies
available in the district courts without expanding their jurisdiciton." Id. at 98.
40. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M KANE, AND A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4 (1985). See also
Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 445
(1954) (Examines the relationship between the Declaratory Judgment Act and federal
question jurisdiction, and concludes that reforms are needed. Trautman reasons that determination of federal issues should not be determined solely from the plaintiff's complaint); Note, Developments in the Law - Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787
(1949) (Examines development of the declaratory judgment as a remedy; nature and
functions of declaratory relief; availability of the remedy in conjunction with federal
question and other bases of subject matter jurisdiction; surveys recent cases); Comment,
Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 55 Ky L.J. 150 (1966)
(Examines the nexus between federal question jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Concludes there is a need for greater judicial clarification of the relationship
between the Declaratory Judgment Act and federal question jurisdiction); Note, Federal
Question Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 4
V AND. L. REV. 827 (1951) (Focuses on the relationship between the Declaratory Judgment
Act and federal question jurisdiction. Concludes that the rule forbidding the anticipation of a defense was not designed to cover the Declaratory Judgment Act).
41. C. WRIGHT, A MILLER, AND M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2767
(1984).
42. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). In Skelly, an oil company filed a complaint for declaratory
relief against three oil producers in an effort to enforce a contract between the oil company and the producers. Id. at 670-71. The Supreme Court held that an action under
contract does not raise a federal question, and therefore dismissed the case for lack of
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 678-79. The Court also stated that the Declaratory Judgment
Act is procedural only; it does not expand or limit the bounds of federal jurisdiction. Id.
at 671-74.
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tion that would have been necessary, absent the declaratory
judgment procedure, could have been heard in federal court.43
Thus, if a court would have had jurisdiction over an action
brought by a plaintiff seeking a traditional form of relief, it
would also have power to hear that plaintiff's declaratory relief
action. 44 Similarly, a declaratory relief action seeking to test a
defense is triable in the federal courts provided this defense
would normally arise in an answer to a complaint which itself
would properly raise a federal question. 45 In Clippers, the NBA
was attempting to test its defense to the Clippers threatened antitrust action. The NBA wanted the Ninth Circuit to declare
that the league would not be in violation of the antitrust laws if
it sought sanctions against the Clippers.46 In this type of declaratory relief action, where the plaintiff seeks protection from conduct on behalf of the defendant which would possibly violate
federal law, the positions of the parties are reversed; the issue
then becomes whether the declaratory relief defendant could
raise a federal question in a complaint.47 If yes, the dispute falls
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction.48
If it is assumed that the federal courts had jurisdiction to
hear this case, it must be determined whether the grant of summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was
43. Id. at 673-74. In Skelly, the Supreme Court held that the district court lacked
jurisdiciton to entertain a federal declaratory claim seeking to establish what was in effect a reply to an anticipated federal defense. Id. With regard to Skelly, one commentator has observed: "In order to state a proper claim for declaratory relief under the [federal declaratory relief) statute, a complainant in a declaratory judgment action may
assert rights that ordinarily would only be invoked as defenses or as replies to defenses
in actions for traditional forms of relief." Waldman, Federal Jurisdiction over Declaratory Suits Challenging State Controversy, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 987 (1979).
44. Skelly, 339 U.S. 667.
45. Note, Developments in the law - Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787,
803 (1949). See supra note 40.
46. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 563.
47. Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.
1986). In Levin, the court stated:
When a declaratory judgment plaintiff asserts a claim that is
in the nature of a defense to a threatened or pending action,
the character of the threatened or pendeing action determines
whether federal jurisdiction exists with regard to the declaratory judgment action. If ... the declaratory judgment defendant could have brought a coercive action in federal court to
enforce its rights, jurisdiction exists for declaratory relief.
Id. at 1315. (For the facts to this case, see infra note 93).
48. Id. at 1315.
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appropriate."g It is proper for a federal court to grant a motion
for summary judgment only if there are no genuine issues of material fact. ISO Antitrust actions, by their very nature, are poorly
suited for disposition by summary judgment.IS! In antitrust
cases, questions of motive or intent, credibility, and conspiracy
frequently prevent summary judgment from being entered because these issues involve subjective questions regarding state of
mind that can only be decided after a full trial.1S2 The Supreme
Court has indicated that summary procedures should be used
only sparingly in complex antitrust litigation.1S3
IV. BACKGROUND

In 1890, Congress approved the Sherman Act. M Comprised
of several laws, ISIS the Act was designed to control the exercise of
private economic power by preventing monopolies, punishing
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
50. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961). The action was initiated in district court by Poller on behalf of an organization that once operated a local television station in Wisconsin. ld. at 467. Poller asserted that CBS violated
the antitrust laws when it allegedly conspired with another local television station in an
effort to monopolize the Milwaukee market. ld. The district court granted summary
judgment to CBS, and the circuit court affirmed. ld. The Supreme Court, however, found
that there were genuine issues of material fact and therefore reversed. ld. at 474. The
Court stated that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust
litigation. ld. at 473. See also California Steel and Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 650 F.2d
1001 (9th Cir. 1981). California Steel and Tube brought an antitrust action alleging that
Kaiser Steel's acquisition of a steel tubing division violated the Sherman Act. ld. In
reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit stated "that
summary judgment is to be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation in which motive and intent play leading roles." ld. at 1003, citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961).
51. Paller, 368 U.S. at 473.
52. ld.
53. ld. at 473.
54. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1983).
55. ld. Section 1 is of primary importance here. It provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal •.. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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cartels, and otherwise protecting competition.'16 It is the freedom
of competition that ostensibly promotes general welfare in the
economy.57
The application of antitrust law to sports league restrictions
on franchise movement is a recent development, and the Ninth
Circuit has acknowledged that its application here is unusual. 58
56. Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). Standard Oil sold gasoline to "jobbers" at 1.5 cents less per gallon than it did to retail gas stations. ld. at 235. ("Jobbers"
were gas distributors who sold at both retail and wholesale prices. ld. at 235). The Supreme Court held that such activity did in fact have an adverse impact on competition,
but was justified by Standard Oil's good faith belief that the price differential was necessary to retain the "jobbers" as customers. ld. at 246. Justice Burton, writing for the
Court, commented, "The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the
value of competition." ld. at 248. See also Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104
F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), a!f'd 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S.
991 (1956), reh'g denied 351 U.S. 928 (1956). The United States District Court for the
Central District of California held that the antitrust laws were not violated when an ice
cream company cut prices, because there was no intent to destroy competition. ld. at
807. Chief Judge Yankwich stated, "the object of the antitrust law is to encourage competition." ld.
57. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In Northern Pacific
Railway, the federal government brought suit to enjoin a railroad from the practice of
"preferential routing." ld. at 3-4. Under this practice, the railroad would lease land on
the condition that the lessee would ship all goods produced on the land via the railroad.
ld. at 3. The government alleged that such routing imposed a restraint on trade, and was
therefore in violation of the Sherman Act. ld. at 3-4. The Supreme Court agreed, and
held that "preferential routing" was a violation of the antitrust laws. ld. at 12.
58. NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Antitrust
laws have been applied to sports leagues in other contexts, such as player contracts and
the draft. See North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249,
(2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Professional soccer league filed suit
alleging a professional football league's ban on ownership by its members of teams in
competing leagues violated the Sherman Act. Held: Sherman Act violated); Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Player alleged that the NFL draft
violated the Sherman Act because it limited a player's ability to compete economically.
Held: Draft has an anticompetitive impact on players); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (Rule requiring a team which acquires a player in a
trade to compensate the player's former team (The Rozelle Rule) was held to violate the
Sherman Act); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F.Supp 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal vacated, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (The "Rozelle Rule," as well as the draft rule, among other league practices, were deemed to violate the antitrust laws); Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Player argued that league rule banning one-eyed hockey players for safety reasons was
anticompetitive. Held: Antitrust laws not violated); Brenner v. World Boxing Council,
675 F.2d 445 (2nd Cir. 1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 835 (1982) (Boxing promoter was
suspended by the World Boxing Council for violation of safety regulations. Held: No
antitrust violation); Hayes v. National Football League, 469 F. Supp. 247. (C.D. Cal.
1979) (Use of a "standard player contract" form when a player signed with an NFL team
did not result in any restraint of trade. Held: No antitrust violation); United States
Football League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (USFL
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Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit held in Raiders I that the National Football League had violated the antitrust laws when it
attempted to prevent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los
Angeles. 1I9
The Raiders I court held that the rule of reason antitrust
analysis, and not the per se analysis, applies to sports league created restraints on franchise movement. 60 The expression "per se
violation" refers to those activities which are manifestly anticompetitive, and therefore violate the antitrust laws. 61 These
per se violations include price fixing, bid rigging, market division, and certain types of group boycotts. 62 Under the per se
analysis, the court 'need only identify the activity complained of,
and determine if it fits within one of the proscribed categories. 63
If the activity does not constitute a per se violation, the court
must conduct the more elaborate inquiry necessary under the
rule of reason analysis.64
When applying the rule of reason, the trier of fact examines
all the surrounding circumstances to determine if the restraint
tends to promote or suppress competition. 611 If the restraint proasserted that the existence of contracts between the NFL and the three major television
networks violated the antitrust laws. Held: Antitrust laws not violated).
Interestingly, baseball is exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The Supreme Court first
considered the application of federal antitrust law to professional sports in Federal Baseball Clubs, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
The Court held that professional baseball is not involved in interstate commerce, and
therefore is not subject to the Sherman Act. ld. at 209. The Court reached this conclusion even though teams from different states competed against one another. ld. at 207.
Baseball's unique exemption status persists to the present day. Annotation, Application
of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 18 ALR FED 489, 504 (1974).
59. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1398 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders 1].
60. ld. at 1391.
61. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
See infra note 106.
.
62. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 22 (1984).
63. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-89 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 936 (1979). The owner of a furniture store brought an antitrust action against three
condominium complexes alleging that they conspired to restrain trade by refusing to
allow him to advertise in their paper. ld. at 383. The court held that there was no antitrust violation. ld. at 381.
64. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958). See supra note 57.
65. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Chicago
Board of Trade adopted what is known as the "Call" rule. ld. at 237. This rule provided
that no trading shall take phice between the close of call and the opening of the trade
session on the next business day. ld. Justice Brandeis found that the "Call" rule created
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motes competition, it is reasonable. 66 Conversely, if the restraint
suppresses competition, it is unreasonable and in violation of the
antitrust laws.67 In contrast to the per se approach, the mere
existence of a restraint does not necessitate a finding of antitrust
violations. 68
The Raiders I court, citing Kaplan v. Burroughs,69 held that
the plaintiff, under the rule of reason analysis, must prove three
elements to establish a prima facie antitrust case.70 The plaintiff
must show: (1) there was an agreement between two or more
persons; (2) the agreement was intended to restrict or restrain
competition or trade; and (3) that competition or trade was in
fact hindered by the agreement.71
In Raiders I, the NFL asserted that it was not subject to the
antitrust laws because it is a single entity.72 As such, it was incapable of making an agreement with itself which was intended to
keep the Raiders in Oakland. The Ninth Circuit held, however,
that the NFL is not a single entity for antitrust purposes.73
Rather, it is a league of twenty eight (28) teams - twenty two
(22) of which voted to keep the Raiders in Oakland.74 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the NFL's restraint on trade and compea restraint on trade. Id. at 239. In finding the restraint reasonable - and therefore not in
violation of the antitrust laws - Justice Brandeis utilized the following test: "The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and thereby
perhaps promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition." Id. at 238. See also Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) (An in-depth examination of
the author's perspective on the appropriate role of the rule of reason and per se concept
as applied to price fixing and market division).
66. Chicago Bd., 246 U.S. at 238.
67.Id.
68.Id.
69. 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980). Kaplan was
a trustee in bankruptcy for a data processing corporation. Id. at 267. He filed an antitrust action against Burroughs, a computer manufacturer, claiming that Burroughs had
conspired with another data processing corporation to restrain trade. Id. at 288. Kaplan's
suit was unsuccessful, however, because he failed to establish a relevant market in which
the alleged restraint occurred. Id. at 296.
70. In Clippers, the establishment of these three elements was left to the district
court on remand. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 570.
71. [d. at 567.
72. Raiders [, 726 F.2d at 1387. The first element of Kaplan requires an agreement.
[d. at 1391. A single entity cannot conspire to agree with itself. [d. at 1387.
73. [d. at 1390.
74. [d. at 1387-90.
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tition was unreasonable, and therefore violated the antitrust
laws.'5
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in Raiders
II.'s In this action, the court held that the Raiders recovery from
the NFL for violation of the antitrust laws must be off-set
against the amount the NFL lost when the Raiders seized the
Los Angeles area franchise opportunity." Thus, through Raiders
I and Raiders II, the Ninth Circuit developed an analytical
framework for application of the antitrust laws in the area of
sports league relocation rules. Utilizing this framework, the
Ninth Circuit again considered the application of antitrust law
to sports league created restrictions on franchise movement in
the Clippers case.'8
V. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

PROCEDURE

In NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc.,'9 both the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum and the San Diego Clippers argued that
there was no "actual controversy" which would allow federal
jurisdiction over the NBA's request for declaratory judgment.8o
They claimed that since the NBA had taken no affirmative action to sanction the Clippers or deny them scheduling rights in
Los Angeles, the issues of the case were not sufficiently refined
to allow federal jurisdiction.81 The defendants asserted that it
was unlikely that the NBA would be willing to sanction the Clip75. Id. at 1401. Actually, the court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding
the jury's verdict. Id. at 1398. It must be presumed, therefore, that all three Kaplan
elements were proven to the satisfaction of the jury.
76. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d
1356 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Raiders 11].
77. Id. at 1373.
78. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 563.
79. National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562, (9th Cir. 1987).
80. Id. at 565. The Clippers and the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum were co-defendants in this action. Id.
81. Id. The defense asserted that the reasoning of Hendrix v. Poonai, 662 F.2d 719
(11th Cir. 1981), was applicable here. In Hendrix, a hospital sought a declaration that its
refusal to hire a doctor would not violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 720. Since the hospital had not yet refused to hire the doctor, there was no actual controversy. Id. at 722.
The Eleventh Circuit held that no jurisdiction existed over such an abstract question
"based upon the possibility of a factual situation that may never develop." Id.
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pers. 82 To resolve the actual controversy issue, the court used
the test provided in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and
Oil CO.83 There, the Supreme Court stated that declaratory judgments are justiciable if "there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment. "84
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that
the claim for declaratory relief was based on a hypothetical set
of facts. 85 Rather, the court determined that the NBA's claim for
declaratory relief was not overly speculative. 88 It found the
NBA's complaint for declaratory relief to seek a determination
which would, in essence, permit the league to evaluate and assess limits on franchise movement without violating the antitrust laws. 87 As further evidence of an actual controversy, the
court stated that the defendants have been in direct conflict
with the NBA on many issues.88 The court, citing Societe de
Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g CO.,89 held
that the claim for declaratory relief was justiciable due to the
NBA's "real and reasonable apprehension" that any action on
the Clippers move could result in antitrust liability.9o
The Coliseum further attacked by asserting that the court
had no federal question jurisdiction.91 The Coliseum argued that
the antitrust issues were in fact contract issues, and therefore
82. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 566.
83. 312 U.S. 270, (1941). See supra notes 30-34.
84. Maryland Casualty, 312 U.S. at 23. See supra notes 30-34.
85. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 565-66.
86.Id.
87.Id.
88. Id. at 568. There were several genuine issues of fact: 1) The purpose of the restraint as demonstrated by the NBA's use of a variety of criteria in evaluating franchise
movement; 2) the market created by professional basketball, which the NBA alleged is
substantially different from that of professional football; 3) the actual effect the NBA's
limitations on movements might have on trade; and 4) whether the mere requirement
that a team seek NBA Board of Governor approval before it seizes a new franchise location violates the Sherman Act. Id.
89. 655 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981). In Societe, plaintiff brought an action seeking
a declaratorY judgment that a patent owned by the defendant was invalid. Id. at 940.
The court held that there is a "case or controversy" if the plaintiff has a real and reasonable apprehension of liability. Id. at 944.
90. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 566.
91. Id.
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should have been resolved in state court.92 The court was not
persuaded by this argument. 93 Citing Levin Metals Corp. v.
Parr-Richmond Terminal Corp.,94 the court said, "If ... the declaratory judgment defendant could have brought a coercive action in federal court to enforce its rights, jurisdiction exists for
declaratory relief."95 Since the Clippers and the Coliseum had
threatened the NBA with antitrust litigation for any interference with the move, the NBA could seek declaratory relief from
that liability.96 The court further held that the existence of a
state contract defense did not defeat federal jurisdiction over
the antitrust dispute. 97
The court also held that the grant of summary judgment
was inappropriate in this case. 98 Granting a motion for summary
judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of
material fact.99 In this case, there were several antitrust issues in
dispute which could be resolved only by a trier of fact.loo Summary judgment is disfavored in heavily factual settings such as
complex antitrust cases that involve issues of motive and intent. IOI While the proper case may warrant summary judgment,
the court held that in this case there remain genuine issues of
material fact, and that summary judgment should not have been
granted. lo2
B.

ANTITRUST

The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the antitrust issues was con92. [d. The contractual relationship is a joint venture under the laws of New York
State. [d. at 564.
93. [d. at 566.
94. 799 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1986). Parr-Richmond sold some contaminated land to
Levin Metals. [d. at 1314. Levin Metals threatened to sue under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [hereinafter CERCLA].
[d. A suit by Levin Metals would be within the court's federal question jurisdiction. [d.
at 1315. Therefore, the court held, a counterclaim by Parr-Richmond seeking declaratory relief under CERCLA would also fall within the court's jurisdiction. [d.
95. [d. at 1315.
96. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 566.
97. [d.
98. [d. at 566-67.
99. [d. On review, the court will view the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. [d. at 567.
100. See supra note 87.
101. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. See supra notes 49-53.
102. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. See supra note 87.
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sistent with the precedent established in Raiders 1 and Raiders
11.103 The court asserted that the resolution of the Clipper's case
would be controlled by those opinions. l04 It rejected the defendants' contention that a restriction on franchise movement in and
of itself violates the antitrust laws. l05
Pursuant to Raiders 1, the court held that the antitrust
analysis of a sports league's franchise relocation rule is governed
by the rule of reason. lOG To be successful, the antitrust plaintiff
must establish that the pro competitive attributes of a restraint
are outweighed by its anticompetive attributes. l07 If such is the
case, the restraint will be deemed unreasonable. lOB
The Clippers court - again following the lead of the Raiders court - asserted that the antitrust plaintiff must meet the
three elements of Kaplan. l09 The Raiders court had carefully examined the structure of professional football using the Kaplan
standard. llo It concluded that the relevant market for professional football, the history and purpose of the franchise movement rule, and the lack of justification for the rule under the
ancillary restraint doctrine supported the jury's verdict.l11 In so
103. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567-69.
104. ld. at 567.
105. ld.
106. ld. See supra notes 60-68.
107. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691
(1978). This antitrust action was brought by the United States to nullify an association's
cannon of ethics prohibiting bidding by its member engineers. ld. at 681. The key inquiry is whether the restraint will promote competiton, or suppress it. ld. at 690. If the
restraint tends to regulate and thereby enhance competition, it will be deemed reasonable. ld. at 691. If the restraint tends to suppress and thereby diminish competition, it
will be deemed unreasonable. ld.
108. ld. at 691.
109. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567. See supra notes 69-71, and accompanying text.
110. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567.
111. ld. Analysis of violations under section I of the Sherman Act requires inquiry
into several complex matters. There must be proof of a contract, combination, or conspiracy; proof that the restraint is unreasonable; and proof that the restraint affects interstate commerce. ld. See supra note 28, and accompanying text. The most difficult of
these inquiries is whether the restraint is reasonable. The court must decide whether the
case should be analyzed under the per se approach, or under the rule of reason. The
Raiders cases were analyzed under the rule of reason. See supra notes 60-71, and accompanying text. Therefore the court had to determine whether there was a restraint, and if
there was, whether it was reasonable. See supra notes 60-71, and accompanying text.
In the Clippers case, the Ninth Circuit merely determined that the rule of reason
should be applied to the dispute. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 568. The actual analysis under
the rule of reason, however, was to be conducted by the district court on remand. ld. at
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doing, the Raiders I court did not establish an absolute rule for
sports leagues. ll2 Rather, it examined the facts before it and
concluded that the NFL violated the antitrust laws. us
Since the district court did not apply the rule of reason
analysis, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, and
remanded the case for trial in accordance with the dictates of
Raiders I and Raiders II. U4
VI. CRITIQUE

A.

PROCEDURE

To bring a declaratory relief action in federal court, the
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy and argue that the case raises a federal question.1l5
The U.S. Constitutionu6 and the Declaratory Judgment
Actll7 require that the parties have an actual controversy before
the federal courts will have jurisdiction. us When the Clippers
moved to Los Angeles in 1984, the League did not have a restriction against team moves. ll9 The NBA adopted Article 9A and
brought suit against the Clippers after the team had relocated. 120
The League had previously adopted no restrictions which could
have prevented the Clippers move, nor hindered the franchise's
ability to compete. 121 The Clippers argued that the team had no
reason to file an antitrust action, and therefore the NBA's complaint for declaratory relief must fail for lack of an actual controversy.122 An understanding of the sequence of events is very
570. See supra notes 102-13, and accompanying text.
112. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567.
113. [d.
114. [d. at 570.
115. See supra notes 28-48, and accompanying text.
116. U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl. 1. See supra note 28.
117. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). See supra note 28.
118. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
The parties must have adverse legal interests. [d. See supra notes 28-48, and accompanying text.
119. National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir.
1987).
120. [d.
121. [d. The League's constitution required the Clippers to secure permission from
the Los Angeles Lakers. [d. The Clippers complied with this provision. [d.
122. [d. at 565. Arguably the Clippers' move violated the team's obligations under
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important to this argument. When the Clippers moved to Los
Angeles, the league arguably had no mechanism to restrict
them.12s The NBA sought a declaratory judgment stating that
the league would not be in violation of the antitrust laws if they
attempted to sanction the Clippers. 124 But the Clippers were already in Los Angeles, and therefore had no reason to file an
antitrust action against the NBA. They had moved prior to the
adoption of Article 9A and therefore, arguably, there was no actual controversy.12t5 The NBA countered that Article 9A was
merely a codification of previous practice and therefore enforceable against the Clippers. 128 The court, recognizing that the
Clippers had threatened the NBA with an antitrust suit for any
efforts to prevent the move - including attempts to sanction
the team after the move - appropriately determined that there
was an actual controversy.127
In addition to an actual controversy, the complaint raised a
federal question. 128 When seeking a traditional form of relief, the
well-pleaded complaint rule requires that the complaint raise a
federal question, rather than assert what the defendant might
raise as a defense. 129 Were this a traditional action, the court
would not have had jurisdiction because the antitrust issue
would arise only as a defense to the NBA's efforts to sanction
the Clippers.13O A declaratory judgment action, however, may be
entertained in federal court if, in addition to an actual controversy, the subject matter of the suit falls within the court's jurisdiction. lsl In this case, an actual controversy existed involving
the Sherman Act, presenting a federal question which gave the
court subject matter jurisdiction. If this were a traditional action, it could have been brought by the Clippers, but not the
the joint venture laws of the State of New York. Though this contract issue could be
resolved in state court, it does not negate the federal court's antitrust jurisdiction. [d. at
566.
123. [d. at 564.
124. [d.
125. [d.
126. [d. See supra note 18.
127. Clippers, F.2d at 568.
128. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 772 (1950). See supra
notes 42-44, and accompanying text.
129. [d.
130. See supra notes 28-48, and accompanying text. In a traditional action, the
NBA could not have brought an antitrust action against the Clippers in federal court. [d.
131. [d.
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NBA. The Declaratory Judgment Act, however, permits the
NBA to raise the antitrust question on the face of its
complaint. 132
Since the case presented an actual controversy involving an
issue within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,
it is apparent that the court had the power to hear this case.
B.

ANTITRUST

The Ninth Circuit's opinion carefully follows the dictates of
Raiders I and Raiders II, and appears to be an appropriate application of antitrust law. The Raiders I court found that the
NFL was not immune from the antitrust laws as a single business entity.133 Moreover, the Raiders I court held that the rule
of reason analysis governs a professional sports league's efforts
to restrict franchise movement. 134 Consistently, the Clippers
court determined that the rule of reason analysis applies to the
NBA's attempt to control franchise moves,135 and that whether
the NBA is a single entity for purposes of antitrust analysis remains a question of fact.13s

Raiders I did not hold that league created restrictions on
franchise movement constitute per se violations of the antitrust
laws. 137 More narrowly, the Raiders I court found that a jury,
applying the rule of reason standard, could reasonably have
found that the NFL violated antitrust laws in restraining the
Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. 13s
Whether the NBA restrained the Clippers from moving to
Los Angeles or not is a difficult question of fact.139 The Clippers
asserted that they were in Los Angeles before the NBA created
rules regarding franchise moves. 140 As such, the NBA could not
132. [d.
133. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1390 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders I].
134. [d. at 1390-92. See supra notes 58-71, and accompanying text.
135. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 567-68.
136. [d.
137. [d. at 567.
138. [d.
139. [d.
140. [d. at 564.
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have restrained the move. l41 Conversely, the NBA argued that
Article 9A of the NBA Constitution essentially codified past
practice within the NBA, and prohibited the Clippers from moving. 142 Thus, it is unclear whether the Clippers were restricted
from moving, much less whether there were any unreasonable
restraints on trade. These are questions of fact which will be answered by a jury on remand.
The district court's assertion that the NBA "could not possibly win this case" is without foundation.143 Even if the Clippers do in fact establish that restrictions on trade or competition
were created by the NBA Constitution, the NBA need only establish that those restrictions were reasonable. 144 The mere existence of a restraint on trade does not constitute an antitrust violation.145 Recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit appropriately
reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for
trial. 146
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit is the leading authority on the application of antitrust law to sports league created restraints on
franchise movement. Though the results of the Raiders and
Clippers' cases may ultimately be different, the underlying
framework of analysis has been applied consistently in each
opinion. In the Raiders I and Raiders II opinions, the court established the method for antitrust analysis in this area. The
Clippers opinion reasserted and confirmed the soundness of the
court's antitrust approach. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has
recognized that the activities of the NFL and the NBA are
within the flow of interstate commerce. As such, they are subject to the dictates of the federal antitrust laws. An attempt by a
league to restrict teams from relocating is not a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. Rather, the court will apply the rule of rea141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 565.
144. Id. at 567. To establish reasonableness, the NBA need only show that the
procompetitive effects of the restraint outweigh its anticompetitive effects. See supra
text note 65, and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying note 65.
146. Clippers, 815 F.2d at 570.
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son analysis to determine, on a case by case basis, if the restriction constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws. This approach
is more beneficial than the per se approach because it recognizes
the team's legitimate interest in moving to a market where
greater profits may be realized, as well as the league's legitimate
interest in restricting franchise moves to enhance the league's
economic stability. Though it is certain that antitrust law was
not created with this situation in mind, the analysis used by this
court makes its application here seem clearly appropriate.

Ronald J. Shingler*

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989.
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